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The Effect of Cash, Vouchers, and Food Transfers on 
Intimate Partner Violence: Evidence from a Randomized 
Experiment in Northern Ecuador†
By Melissa Hidrobo, Amber Peterman, and Lori Heise*
Using a randomized experiment in Ecuador, this study provides 
evidence on whether cash, vouchers, and food transfers targeted 
to women and intended to reduce poverty and food insecurity also 
affected intimate partner violence. Results indicate that transfers 
reduce controlling behaviors and physical and/or sexual violence by 
6 to 7 percentage points. Impacts do not vary by transfer modality, 
which provides evidence that transfers not only have the potential 
to decrease violence in the short-term, but also that cash is just as 
effective as in-kind transfers. (JEL I38, J16, K42, O15, O17)
Recent multicountry studies show that intimate partner violence (IPV) is wide-spread and common. One in three women globally have experienced physi-
cal and/or sexual violence by a partner during their lifetime (Devries et al. 2013, 
World Health Organization (WHO) 2013). In Ecuador, the country examined in this 
analysis, the lifetime prevalence of IPV is estimated at 35 percent for physical vio-
lence, 14.5 percent for sexual violence, and 43.4 percent for psychological violence 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INEC) 2011). Although regional varia-
tion exists across provinces within Ecuador, as well as within and between countries 
globally, the prevalence of IPV remains high in most parts of the world.
While the consequences of IPV are well documented, there is less evidence on 
policies and programs that are effective at reducing IPV in the developing world 
(Ellsberg et al. 2015). Many development programs aim at empowering women 
through economic means such as labor, assets, microfinance, or cash transfers (CTs). 
Yet, across and within disciplines as varied as sociology, psychology, and econom-
ics, there is no consensus on the theories and predicted association between female 
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 economic empowerment and IPV (Heise 2012). The contribution of  economics on the 
relationship between a woman’s income and IPV has been fairly recent and depends 
on how violence is modeled in household bargaining models. In classic bargaining 
models, individual control of resources matters because bargaining outcomes depend 
on threat points such as divorce (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 
1981) or noncooperative equilibriums (Lundberg and Pollak 1993). The more prom-
ising an individual’s opportunities are outside the household, the more credible the 
threat point, and therefore, the more likely that the  intra-household distribution of 
resources will align more closely with that individual’s preferences. In these bargain-
ing models, when violence is expressive and used to release frustration, an increase in 
a woman’s income decreases violence by improving her threat point and thus her bar-
gaining power within the household (Farmer and Tiefenthaler 1997). However, when 
violence is either instrumental and used to control the victim’s behavior or allocation 
of resources within the household (Eswaran and Malhotra 2011; Tauchen, Witte, and 
Long 1991), or extractive and used to extract monetary transfers from the victim or 
her family (Bloch and Rao 2002), an increase in her income may increase violence.
Given the lack of consensus on theories related to a woman’s income and IPV, it 
is no surprise that the empirical evidence is also mixed. To add to the ambiguity, few 
studies have accounted for the endogeneity of economic status or income, and thus 
most of the evidence consists of basic associations that tell us little about the causal 
mechanisms. The few studies that have attempted to account for the endogeniety 
of income or economic status have used exogenous variation in either demand or 
supply of labor (Aizer 2010, Chin 2012) or randomized allocation of microfinance 
(Pronyk et al. 2006), and have found a negative relationship between a woman’s 
economic status and IPV.
Building off a robust literature on the social impacts of CT programs, a number of 
recent papers have examined linkages between CTs and IPV. Although the details of 
program design vary, all such programs transfer monetary resources to poor house-
holds, and in the vast majority of cases, transfers are made to women because they 
are more likely to reinvest resources into the family’s well-being (Thomas 1997, 
Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000, Hoddinott and Haddad 1995). In general, stud-
ies have found decreases in physical violence that range from 5 to 11 percentage 
points, although some subgroups are found at greater risk for an increase in vio-
lence (Angelucci 2008; Bobonis, González-Brenes, and Castro 2013; Hidrobo and 
Fernald 2013; Haushofer and Shapiro 2013; Perova and Vakis 2013).
Using a randomized experiment conducted in 2011 in Northern Ecuador, this 
study evaluates whether cash, vouchers, and food transfers targeted to women and 
intended to reduce poverty and food insecurity among the urban poor, also impact 
IPV. Comparison of the three transfer modalities—cash, vouchers, or food—is novel 
and contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on whether the mode 
of transfer matters to impact. While a companion study (Hidrobo et al. 2014) finds 
that the transfer modalities were infra-marginal1 and thus had similar impacts on the 
1 Economic theory predicts that cash and in-kind transfers of equal size will have similar impacts on a house-
hold’s utility and consumption if the value of the in-kind transfer is less than what a household would have spent on 
that particular good (“infra-marginal”) and if there are no transaction costs. 
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value of food, nonfood, and total consumption, differences across modalities could 
emerge in who controls the transfer or the likelihood of it being commandeered 
by one partner. Descriptive statistics suggest that food is significantly more likely 
to be controlled by the female spouse than cash or vouchers (60 percent for food 
compared to 50 percent and 48 percent for cash and voucher, respectively), while 
cash and vouchers are significantly more likely to be controlled by household head 
and spouse together. Moreover, there are restrictions on how transfers can be used 
that vary by modality. The food transfer, which is composed mainly of staple goods, 
is expected to be consumed by the household and thus presents little opportunity 
for generating conflict within the household.2 Similarly, the food voucher is 
redeemable for only a predetermined list of nutritious foods at a specified super-
market within each urban center. The voucher is nontransferable and thus cannot 
be extracted and used for anything other than the preapproved list of food items by 
the cardholder. Cash, on the other hand, can be spent without restrictions and thus 
has more opportunity to lead to conflict over its use. Consequently, if partners use 
IPV as a tool to extract resources or control the allocation of resources within the 
household, then we would expect to observe differences in impact across cash and 
the other modalities.
Consistent with evidence on IPV from other studies, we find that transfers decrease 
the probability that women experience controlling behaviors and physical and/or 
sexual violence by 6 to 7 percentage points (or approximately a 19 to 30 percent 
decrease). This effect does not vary significantly by treatment modality, which sug-
gests that violence is not being used to forcefully extract resources. We explore 
potential mechanisms through which transfers decrease violence and find evi-
dence that transfers change expenditure patterns which likely indicates changes in 
 intra-household bargaining; increase time spent on household chores by both hus-
band and wife which may signal increased marital cohesion; and reduce poverty 
which likely reduces poverty-related stress and conflict.
I. Study Design and Data
A. The program
In April 2011, the World Food Programme (WFP) expanded its assistance to 
address the food security and nutrition needs of Colombian refugees and poor 
Ecuadorians, and to support the integration of refugees into Ecuadorian communi-
ties. The new program was designed as a randomized control trial (RCT) and con-
sisted of six monthly transfers of cash, vouchers, or food to Colombian refugees and 
poor Ecuadorian households. In addition to improving the food consumption of poor 
households, a goal of the program was to improve the role of women in  household 
2 Although it is possible that food could be extracted and sold for cash, there is little evidence that this occurred 
in this study. 
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decision making, particularly related to food and nutrition. Consequently, the pro-
gram specifically targeted women within households.3
The program was implemented in seven urban centers with large Colombian ref-
ugee populations in the provinces of Carchi and Sucumbíos in Northern Ecuador. 
To determine program qualification, all households within the pre-chosen neigh-
borhoods4 were mapped and administered a short census survey. Households were 
ranked according to a proxy means test based on asset ownership, employment, food 
security, demographics, and nationality and a cut off score to determine program 
eligibility was implemented based on project budget constraints.5
Participating households received benefits from April 2011 to September 2011. 
The value of the monthly transfer was standardized across all treatment arms and 
was equivalent to $40 per month per household for a total of $240 over the six 
month study period. The monthly value was approximately 11 percent of a house-
hold’s pre-transfer monthly consumption. The food transfer contained rice (24 kilo-
grams (kg)), lentils (8 kg), vegetable oil (4 liters), and canned sardines (8 cans 
each 0.425 kg). The food voucher was redeemable at local supermarkets for a pre-
approved list of nutritious foods. The cash was distributed though preprogrammed 
ATM cards. The transfers were conditional on attendance of monthly nutrition train-
ings, which were standardized across treatment arms. The timing of disbursement, 
frequency, and value of transfers were equalized across modalities to ensure that 
differences in outcomes were attributable to the modality and not to other confound-
ing factors.
B. study design
The program evaluation was based on random assignment of the intervention. 
Due to the differences in socioeconomic and geographic characteristics of the study 
provinces, Sucumbíos and Carchi, the randomization was stratified at the province 
level. Randomization was conducted in two stages: first neighborhoods within the 
urban centers were randomized to either treatment or control groups (see Figure B.1 
in the online Appendix); and second, clusters within the treatment neighborhoods 
were randomized to either cash, vouchers, or food. The two-stage randomization 
was done to ensure that households in control neighborhoods were in geographically 
distinct locations from those in treatment neighborhoods to help mitigate possible 
discontent among neighbors not receiving the transfer. In total, 80 neighborhoods 
and 145 clusters were randomized into the four intervention arms—control, cash, 
vouchers, and food.
3 Although the program was targeted to women, men were also allowed to participate if there was not a qual-
ifying adult woman in the household at the time of enrollment. Among all beneficiary households, approximately 
79 percent of registered beneficiary cardholders in Carchi and 73 percent of registered beneficiary cardholders in 
Sucumbíos were women (WFP-Ecuador 2011). 
4 Neighborhoods are administrative units within the urban centers and typically headed by presidents with over-
sight on social services and other administrative functions. 
5 Based on point scores by nationality, the decision was made to automatically enroll all Colombian and 
mixed-nationality households. In addition, households were excluded from eligibility if they were current recipi-
ents of the government’s social safety net, the Bonode Desarrollo Human (BDH), which targeted poor households 
with school age and young children. 
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In order to evaluate the transfer program, baseline (March 2011) and endline 
surveys (October to November 2011) were conducted. In total, 2,357 households 
were surveyed at baseline before the start of the transfer program and 2,122 at 
endline after the last transfers were distributed. Household surveys collected infor-
mation on household characteristics, demographics, food consumption, labor, 
education, and health. The survey also collected detailed information on women’s 
status in the household, household decision making, and IPV. Further details about 
the study design, sampling strategy, and intervention can be found in Hidrobo et al. 
(2012, 2014).
C. Violence Variables
Violence indicators were collected in accordance with the WHO protocol on eth-
ical guidelines for conducting research on IPV (WHO 2001).6 To be eligible for 
interview of the IPV module, women had to be 15 years or older, been in a relation-
ship in the last six months, and be either the household head or partner of the house-
hold head. Only women who could be interviewed in private were administered the 
IPV module.7
In order to elicit accurate assessments of violence, we administered multiple 
behaviorally specific questions on a range of abusive acts, a technique shown to 
maximize disclosure (Ellsberg et al. 2001). Indicators of internationally validated 
standardized IPV measures from the WHO Violence Against Women Instrument 
(Ellsberg and Heise 2005; Straus 1979; Hindin, Kishor, and Ansara 2008) were 
administered and included three types of violence (physical, sexual, emotional) and 
controlling behaviors. To correspond with the length of the transfer period, we asked 
about violent acts experienced over the past six months as well as any violence 
experienced by the respondent in her lifetime.
Following WHO and Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) protocol, we con-
struct binary indicators for the following three behaviors experienced in the last 
six months: controlling behaviors, emotional violence, and physical and/or sex-
ual violence. In the endline survey there are six questions that are categorized as 
“emotional violence,” four that are categorized as “controlling behavior,” seven that 
are categorized as “physical violence,” and two that are categorized as “sexual vio-
lence” (see Appendix Table A.1 for questions and corresponding categories).8 For 
controlling behaviors and emotional violence, we create indicators that equal one if 
the respondent answered yes to any of the corresponding violence questions within 
each category in the last six months. For physical and/or sexual violence we create 
an indicator that equals one if the respondent answered yes to any of the seven phys-
ical violence questions or any of the two sexual violence questions.
6 In particular, we ensured adequate training of interviewers, enacted safety measures that guaranteed privacy 
during interviews, and interviewed only one woman per household to ensure that no other household member was 
aware that survey questions involved disclosing IPV. In addition, enumerators provided all women with disguised 
contact information for local IPV support services for referral, regardless of disclosure of IPV. 
7 If a woman was not alone at the time of the interview enumerators were instructed to either find a place where 
they could be alone, or to come back to the household at another time when the woman would be alone. If neither 
of these two options were feasible, then the woman was not administered the IPV module. 
8 The baseline survey only had two questions on controlling behaviors and three on emotional violence. 
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D. study sample and Attrition
Of the 2,357 households interviewed at baseline, 2,064 had a female head of 
household or spouse eligible to be administered the household decision making or 
IPV module (Figure 1). From these households, we restrict our analysis to women 
15–69 years old who are married or in unions at baseline, for a total of 1,433 wom-
en.9 Of the 1,433 women 15 to 69-years-old in relationships at baseline, 1,413 (or 
98.6 percent) were alone at the time of the interview and thus administered the IPV 
module. Of these women, 1,261 were resurveyed at endline and 1,226 were alone 
at the time of the interview and in a relationship, and thus administered the IPV 
module. Thus, the sample for this analysis consists of 1,226 women who are head 
of household or spouse, ages 15 to 69 years and in a relationship at baseline, with 
baseline and endline data on IPV.
Of the eligible baseline sample of 1,433 women aged 15–69 years in a relation-
ship, 85.6 percent were administered the IPV questionnaire at baseline and endline. 
While most of the attrition is due to not finding the same household or woman from 
baseline to endline, 4 percent is due to a woman not being alone at the time of the 
interview (either at baseline or endline) or not being in a relationship at endline. If 
attrition is correlated with treatment assignment, then this could potentially bias 
the estimates of the impact of a transfer on IPV. As Table 1 and online Appendix 
Table B.1 reveal, there are no significant differences in attrition rates between the 
control arm and any of the treatment arms. Although attrition rates are similar across 
arms, differential attrition in characteristics across treatment and control arms could 
threaten the internal validity of the study. Appendix Table A.2 reveals that with the 
exception of the indicator for not having a room exclusively for sleeping, there are 
no significant differences in baseline characteristics for those who attrited across 
treatment and control arms.
E. Baseline Analysis
To ensure that the success of the initial randomization still holds for the sample of 
1,226 women used in this analysis, we compare baseline characteristics across treat-
ment and control women. Table 1 shows that randomization was largely effective 
at balancing baseline characteristics. Across 21 difference-in-means tests between 
treatment and control women, only two are statistically different at the 5 percent 
level. In particular, women in the control group have significantly more children 
aged 6–15 years old and are significantly less likely to have experienced physi-
cal and/or sexual violence from their partner at baseline. While this imbalance in 
our outcome variable would most likely lead to an underestimate of our impact 
results, our empirical specifications minimize any bias by controlling for baseline 
levels of violence. Similar balance tests are conducted across the control arm and 
each treatment arm, and again, show that randomization was in general successful 
9 We exclude women over the age of 69 (18 observations) because IPV is rare among this age group. Although 
IPV decreases with age, we do not restrict our sample to the more common age range of 15–49 years because we 
are interested in the impact on program participants and not a subsample of participants. 
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(online Appendix Table B.1). Across 126 (21 × 6) difference-in-means tests, 3 are 
statistically different at the 5 percent level. With respect to the outcome variable, the 
significant difference seen in Table 1 for physical and/or sexual violence is mainly 
due to a significant difference between the voucher arm and the control arm.
Table 1 also reveals that the baseline prevalence of IPV is high among the study 
sample, with 16 percent of women experiencing physical and/or sexual violence and 
26 percent experiencing emotional violence in the previous six months. Similar to 
the national prevalence rate of 35 percent for lifetime physical violence, the  lifetime 
prevalence rate of physical and/or sexual violence in our sample is 35 percent.
II. Methodology
To estimate the impact of transfers on IPV, we take advantage of the randomized 
experimental design and conduct an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis. This approach 
avoids bias that may occur due to selection into and out of the program. Moreover, 
we estimate the treatment effect using Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), which 
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Figure 1: Flow of Participants and Randomization
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controls for the lagged outcome variable. ANCOVA estimates are preferred to differ-
ence-in-differences estimates when the autocorrelation of outcomes is low (McKenzie 
2012). Intuitively, if autocorrelation is low, then  difference-in-differences estimates 
will overcorrect for baseline imbalances. ANCOVA estimates, on the other hand, 
will adjust for baseline imbalances according to the degree of correlation between 
baseline and endline and lead to a more efficient estimation of impact. Given that the 
autocorrelation between baseline and endline of our IPV outcomes are low (between 
0.27 and 0.35) and that the indicators of interest are binary, we estimate the follow-
ing ANCOVA probit model for pooled treatment:
(1)  prob ( y ij1  = 1) = Φ (∝ +  β T Trea t j + γ y ij0 + δ p ij ) ,
where  y ij1 is the IPV outcome of interest for woman i from cluster j at endline 
and  y ij0 is the IPV outcome of interest at baseline. As previously mentioned, our 
outcomes are measures of: controlling behaviors, emotional violence, and physical 
and/or sexual violence.  Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution.  Treat j is an indicator that equals 1 if cluster j is in any treatment 
arm, and  β T represents the ITT estimator, or the effect of being assigned to any 
Table 1—Baseline Means by Pooled Treatment and Control Groups
Observations All Control Treatment
p-value  
of diff.
Attrition rate 1,433 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.31
Female characteristics
 Head of household 1,226 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.15
 Born in Colombia 1,226 0.36 0.39 0.34 0.40
 Age 1,226 34.84 35.29 34.66 0.43
 Some secondary education or higher 1,226 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.87
 Married 1,226 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.83
 Indigenous 1,226 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.53
 Afro-Ecuadorian 1,226 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.66
 Worked in the last six months 1,226 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.56
 Sole owner of house 1,226 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.44
partner Characteristics
 Partner has some secondary education or higher 1,226 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.42
 Partner’s age 1,226 38.62 39.20 38.39 0.33
 Partner was employed in the last six months 1,226 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.66
 Partner’s hours worked in a typical week 1,226 46.58 47.27 46.32 0.57
Household Characteristics
 Number of children 0–5 years old in household 1,226 0.75 0.72 0.75 0.52
 Number of children 6–15 years old in household 1,226 0.92 1.02 0.87 0.05
 Value of total monthly consumption per capita (USD) 1,222 106.60 107.32 106.31 0.86
 House does not have rooms exclusively for sleeping 1,226 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.37
Lifetime physical and/or sexual violence 1,226 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.64
Controlling behaviors 1,226 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.87
Emotional violence 1,226 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.36
Physical and/or sexual violence 1,226 0.16 0.12 0.18 0.05
p-value from joint F-test 0.16
Notes: p-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of pooled treatment and control for each vari-
able. Comparison of means for female characteristics, partner characteristics, household characteristics, and IPV 
are conducted on the sample of women in the analysis with both baseline and endline data. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the cluster level.
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 treatment arm.  p ij is an indicator for Carchi province, which is the level of stratifi-
cation. In all regressions we adjust standard errors for clustering at the cluster level, 
which was the level of randomization.
Given the relative success of the random assignment, the inclusion of baseline 
controls is not necessary to obtain unbiased estimates of β. For most estimates, how-
ever, we account for baseline socioeconomic characteristics in order to increase the 
precision of the estimates and control for any minor differences between treatment 
and control arms at baseline. The extended baseline control variables are: female 
characteristics (whether the women is head of household, whether she is married, 
whether she has secondary education, whether she is Colombian, whether she is 
indigenous, whether she is Afro-Ecuadorian, whether she is employed, whether she 
owns the house, and her age); partner characteristics (whether partner has secondary 
education, his age); and household characteristics (number of children 0–5 years 
old, number of children 6–14 years old, wealth quartiles).
To estimate whether the impact on IPV varied by modality, we estimate the fol-
lowing ANCOVA probit model:
(2)  prob ( y ij1 = 1) = Φ (∝ +  β f  foo d j +  β c cas h j +  β v vouche r j + γ y ij0 + δ p ij ) .
The indicators foo d j , cas h j , and vouche r j are equal to 1 if cluster j is in the corre-
sponding treatment arm. Coefficients  β f ,   β c ,   β v represent the ITT estimators, or the 
effect of being assigned to the specific treatment arm. To test whether the estimators 
are statistically different by treatment arm, we conduct tests of equality and report 
the p-values.
III. Results
A. Impact of pooled Treatment
Table 2 presents estimates (equation 1) of the pooled treatment on IPV outcomes. 
For each outcome, the first column presents mean differences without any controls, 
the second column presents coefficients controlling only for the level of stratification 
(or province) and baseline outcome variable, and the third column includes the full set 
of extended control variables. Coefficients from probit models are converted to mar-
ginal effects evaluated at the mean of the independent variable. Table 2 reveals that 
there are significant program impacts leading to decreases in controlling behaviors 
and physical and/or sexual violence ranging from 6 to 7 percentage points. Compared 
to the means of the control group at endline, these are decreases ranging from 19 per-
cent for controlling behaviors to 30 percent for physical and/or sexual violence. 
There are no significant impacts on emotional violence. In all cases, the inclusion of 
control variables has very little impact on the size or significance of coefficients.
As a complement to the aggregate IPV measures, we also examine impacts dis-
aggregated by individual question used to construct the IPV measures (Table 3). 
Results indicate a negative and significant impact on the following six indicators: 
accused her of being unfaithful; limited her contact with friends and family; humil-
iated or insulted her; pushed, shook, or threw something at her; slapped or twisted 
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her arm; and tried to choke or burn her. Experience of severe physical (threatening 
or attacking with a weapon) and sexual violence in the last six months is rarely 
reported in our sample, and thus, it is no surprise that we find no impact on these 
individual indicators.
B. Impact by Treatment modality
Table 4 explores whether there are differences in impact across modalities 
(equation 2). Similar to estimates in Table 2, we present marginal effects with no 
control variables, basic control variables, and a full set of control variables. p-values 
from tests of differences on the size of impact across modalities are presented at 
the bottom of each panel. We find that food transfers result in significant and nega-
tive impacts on physical or sexual violence; cash results in significant and negative 
impacts on controlling behaviors; and vouchers result in significant and negative 
impacts on controlling behaviors and physical and/or sexual violence. Impacts for 
these three outcomes are similar in magnitude to the pooled treatment effect, rang-
ing from 6 to 8 percentage point reductions. Differences across modalities are small 
and range from 0 to 3 percentage points in the most robust models. As shown by the 
p-values testing differences across modalities, the impacts across transfer modality 
are not statistically distinguishable from each other.10
10 Although power calculations were conducted on the full sample of households and not the subsample of 
women eligible for the IPV module, differences across modalities are so small, that to detect these impacts samples 
of over 100,000 per arm would be needed. 
Table 2—Impact of Pooled Treatment on Aggregate IPV Measures
Endline  
control mean No controls Basic controls
Extended 
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Controlling behaviors 0.36 −0.07 −0.06 −0.07
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Emotional violence 0.35 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Physical and/or sexual violence 0.20 −0.04 −0.06 −0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Notes: For each IPV measure listed, treatment effects of pooled treatment are reported in columns 2–4. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the cluster level. Basic controls include baseline value of the outcome variable 
and dummy for province stratum. Extended controls include baseline female characteristics (whether the woman 
is head of household, whether she is married, whether she has secondary education, whether she is Colombian, 
whether she is indigenous, whether she is Afro-Ecuadorian, whether she is employed, whether she owns the house, 
and her age); partner characteristics (whether partner has secondary education, his age); household characteristics 
(number of children 0–5 years old, number of children 6–14 years old, wealth quartiles); baseline value of outcome 
variable, and dummy for province stratum. Observations = 1,226.
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Table 3—Impact of Pooled Treatment on Individual IPV Indicators
Endline  
control mean
No  
controls
Basic 
controls
Extended 
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
panel A. Controlling behaviors
Accused you of being unfaithful 0.16 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tried to limit your contact with your family 0.16 −0.04 −0.04 −0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tried to limit your contact with friends 0.17 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Wanted to know where you were at all times 0.24 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
panel B. Emotional violence
Humiliated or insulted you 0.26 −0.05 −0.06 −0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Threatened to leave you 0.15 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Threatened to take away your children 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Threatened to hurt you or someone you care about 0.05 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Ignored you or was indifferent towards you 0.23 −0.05 −0.05 −0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Humiliated or insulted you in front of others 0.16 −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
panel C. physical and/or sexual violence
Pushed you or shook you or threw something at you 0.13 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Slapped you or twisted your arm 0.11 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Hit you with his fist or something else that could hurt you 0.09 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Kicked you or dragged you 0.06 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tried to choke or burn you 0.04 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Attacked you with a gun, knife, or other weapon 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Threatened you with a gun, knife, or other weapon 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Physically forced you to have sexual intercourse 0.05 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Forced you to do something sexual that you found degrading 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Notes: For each IPV indicator listed, treatment effects of pooled treatment are reported in columns 2–4. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the cluster level. Basic controls include baseline value of the outcome vari-
able (when available) and dummy for province stratum. Extended controls include baseline female characteristics 
(whether the woman is head of household, whether she is married, whether she has secondary education, whether 
she is Colombian, whether she is indigenous, whether she is Afro-Ecuadorian, whether she is employed, whether 
she owns the house, and her age); partner characteristics (whether partner has secondary education, his age); house-
hold characteristics (number of children 0–5 years old, number of children 6–14 years old, wealth quartiles); base-
line value of outcome variable (when available), and dummy for province stratum. Observations = 1,226.
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C. Robustness
We present results from different robustness checks in the online Appendix. In 
particular, we show that results are robust to linear probability models (Appendix 
Table B.2), and bounding our treatment estimates to address potential issues of non-
random sample selection (Appendix Table B.3). To bound our estimates we follow 
Lee (2009) and construct worst-case scenarios by assuming that women who select 
into the sample because of treatment (marginal women) are at the very top or very 
Table 4—Impact of Treatment Modalities on IPV Measures
No controls Basic controls Extended controls
panel A. Controlling behaviors
Food treatment −0.06 −0.05 −0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Cash treatment −0.09 −0.08 −0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Voucher treatment −0.06 −0.06 −0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
p-value: Food = Voucher 0.94 0.83 0.97
p-value: Cash = Voucher 0.35 0.55 0.56
p-value: Food = Cash 0.50 0.50 0.66
panel B. Emotional violence
Food treatment −0.05 −0.05 −0.05
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Cash treatment −0.06 −0.06 −0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Voucher treatment −0.01 −0.03 −0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
p-value: Food = Voucher 0.50 0.68 0.44
p-value: Cash = Voucher 0.18 0.43 0.40
p-value: Food = Cash 0.75 0.82 0.94
panel C. physical and/or sexual violence
Food treatment −0.06 −0.07 −0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cash treatment −0.04 −0.05 −0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Voucher treatment −0.04 −0.06 −0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
p-value: Food = Voucher 0.52 0.71 0.54
p-value: Cash = Voucher 0.96 0.73 0.87
p-value: Food = Cash 0.57 0.52 0.46
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the cluster level. Basic controls include 
baseline value of the outcome variable and dummy for province stratum. Extended controls 
include baseline female characteristics (whether the woman is head of household, whether she 
is married, whether she has secondary education, whether she is Colombian, whether she is 
indigenous, whether she is Afro-Ecuadorian, whether she is employed, whether she owns the 
house, and her age); partner characteristics (whether partner has secondary education, his age); 
household characteristics (number of children 0–5 years old, number of children 6–14 years 
old, wealth quartiles); baseline value of outcome variable, and dummy for province stratum. 
Observations = 1,226.
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bottom of the distribution.11 Thus, trimming the upper and lower tails of the distri-
bution of the outcome variable by the proportion of marginal women yields bounds 
on the treatment effects for women who select into the survey irrespective of the 
treatment assignment. Appendix Table B.3 reveals tight bounds on the pooled treat-
ment estimates and the modality specific estimates, which is not surprising given 
that the difference in non-missing observations between the treatment and control 
arms is quite small.
IV. Possible Mechanisms
While our results provide strong evidence that transfers reduce IPV among the 
study population, the pathway or mechanism through which this occurs is unclear. 
Although we cannot disentangle the different mechanisms, we explore other factors 
that have changed as a result of the transfer that may have contributed to the decrease 
in IPV. In particular, we explore changes in a woman’s bargaining power, labor allo-
cation, and poverty. A few of these have been explored in companion papers, thus 
we only discuss and cite the results here.
To investigate whether the transfers lead to changes in women’s bargaining power 
we analyze changes in the intra-household allocation of goods. Many studies have 
shown that cash transfer programs increase the share of food in total consumption, 
counter to Engel’s Law, suggesting that households treat transfer income differently 
(Angelucci and Attanasio 2013; Attanasio, Battistin, and Mesnard 2012; Gilligan 
et al. 2014; Schady and Rosero 2008; Attanasio and Lechene 2014; Bobonis 2009). 
These studies argue that increases in food shares are likely due to shifts in intra-
household bargaining that align resources more in a woman’s favor. In our case, 
however, increases in food shares could also be explained by changes in preferences 
due to the nutrition trainings. Thus, we explore changes in child-related expenditures 
that would not be influenced by the trainings. In particular, we investigate impacts 
of the program on expenditures on children’s clothes and compare it to changes in 
adult clothes. At baseline the Engel curve for child clothing is downward sloping in 
total consumption and straight in nonfood consumption; in contrast, the Engel curve 
for adult clothing is upward sloping (Appendix Figure A.1). Table 5 reveals that 
counter to the baseline Engel curve, transfers lead to a large and significant increase 
in expenditures and expenditure shares for child clothing, providing suggestive evi-
dence that the allocation of resources has changed more in her favor. In contrast, 
we find no change in expenditure or expenditure shares for adult clothing. Two 
companion papers further explore the impact on women’s bargaining power and find 
qualitative evidence that different domains (such as knowledge and participation) of 
11 The identifying assumption for calculating Lee bounds is monotonicity, which implies that treatment assign-
ment affects sample selection only in one direction. In our case it is likely that treatment leads to households/women 
being found more easily at endline, and households/women being more willing to respond to the survey. Treatment 
is also likely to increase the probability that a woman is alone at the time of the interview, and thus be interviewed, 
since treatment leads to decreases in controlling behaviors of the spouse. The monotonicity assumption, however, 
might be violated if treatment leads to women not being in a relationship at endline and thus not interviewed at end-
line. However, only 1 percent of the eligible baseline sample were no longer in a relationship and thus not surveyed, 
and we find no evidence that treatment leads to higher rates of separation. 
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empowerment have increased, although no impact was found on decision-making 
indicators collected at endline (Buller et al. forthcoming, Peterman et al. 2015).
We also explore whether transfers lead to changes in labor participation or time 
spent on domestic labor. If transfers lead to women and/or their husbands being 
home less frequently, this could reduce the frequency of IPV. Labor participation 
could also contribute to decreases in poverty related stress or improvements in bar-
gaining power. However, if women engage in more work, or interact with new indi-
viduals outside the home, against the wishes of her partner, or in doing so, threaten 
existing power dynamics, IPV could increase. Table 6 reveals no change in labor 
force participation, but large increases in time spent on domestic labor for women 
(panel A) and increases in the probability that men participate in domestic labor 
(panel B). This is likely due to the fact that the training components of the pro-
gram placed a large emphasis on family nutrition and cooking. While men’s greater 
participation in domestic labor could be a sign of improved marital cohesion, her 
increased time spent on domestic labor could be a sign of either greater marital 
cohesion or increased work/stress.
Another pathway through which transfers may have decreased IPV is through 
reductions in poverty related stress and disputes. Although we did not collect direct 
measures of stress, a companion paper on food security shows large improvements 
in poverty related indicators such as increases in the total value of consumption and 
food security, irrespective of transfer modality (Hidrobo et al. 2014). In addition, 
a companion mixed methods paper on IPV further supports theories on stress, and 
shows that transfers lead to a decrease in tensions and disputes in the household, 
especially over daily food purchases, and an increase in happiness and locus of con-
trol (Buller et al. forthcoming).
Table 5—Impact of Pooled Treatment on Expenditure Shares
Adult clothes and shoes Child clothes and shoes
= 1 
purchased
log 
expenditures
Expenditure 
shares over 
nonfood
Expenditure 
shares  
over total
= 1 if 
purchased
log 
expenditures
Expenditure 
shares over 
nonfood
Expenditure 
shares  
over total
Pooled treatment 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.22 0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.18) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.00)
Observations 1,226 1,226 1,219 1,219 1,226 1,226 1,219 1,219
Mean of control  
 group at endline
0.37 0.60 0.06 0.02 0.37 0.48 0.05 0.02
Basic controls X X X X X X X X
Extended controls X X X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the cluster level. All estimations control for baseline female 
characteristics (whether the women is head of household, whether she is married, whether she has secondary edu-
cation, whether she is Colombian, whether she is indigenous, whether she is Afro-Ecuadorian, whether she is 
employed, whether she owns the house, and her age); partner characteristics (whether partner has secondary edu-
cation, his age); household characteristics (number of children 0–5 years old, number of children 6–14 years old, 
wealth quartiles); baseline value of outcome variable, and dummy for province stratum. Expenditure shares are con-
structed by dividing the value of the particular expenditure item over the value of nonfood expenditure or the value 
of total expenditures. Tobit models are used to estimate impacts on log expenditures and expenditure shares due to 
the large fraction of households that have zero expenditures on clothing.
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V. discussion and Conclusion
Important policy questions around linkages between IPV and women’s income 
remain unanswered due to lack of evidence and consensus on theories and mecha-
nisms. With CT programs reaching approximately 750 million to 1 billion people in 
the developing world (Department of International Development (DFID) 2011), it is 
crucial that these programs understand how they may affect intra-household dynam-
ics. The majority of current evidence linking income and IPV is from cross-sectional 
analysis and few studies are able to identify causal impacts.
This study uses a randomized design to investigate whether cash, vouchers, and 
food transfers targeted to women in poor urban areas and intended to reduce pov-
erty and food insecurity also impact IPV. We find that transfers decrease the proba-
bility that a woman experiences controlling behaviors, and physical and/or sexual 
violence by 6 to 7 percentage points or approximately a 19 percent to 30 percent 
decrease from endline control means. These results are similar in  magnitude to 
 studies in Peru, Mexico, and Kenya, which find that CTs decreased physical IPV by 
Table 6—Impact of Pooled Treatment on Labor Participation
Worked in 
agriculture 
on household 
land
Worked in 
agriculture, 
salaried labor
Worked in 
non- 
agriculture, 
salaried labor
Worked 
independent, 
non- 
agriculture 
labor
Worked in  
the last  
six months
Engaged in 
domestic  
labor in last  
two weeks
Hours worked 
in domestic 
labor in a 
typical day
panel A
Pooled treatment 0.00 0.01 −0.03 0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.78
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.25)
Observations 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226
Mean of control group 
 at endline
0.01 0.05 0.19 0.13 0.37 0.98 5.63
Basic controls X X X X X X X
Extended controls X X X X X X X
Partner  
worked in 
agriculture 
on household 
land
Partner  
worked in 
agriculture, 
salaried labor
Partner  
worked in 
non- 
agriculture, 
salaried labor
Partner  
worked in 
independent, 
non- 
agriculture 
labor
Partner  
worked in 
the last 
six months
Partner’s  
hours worked 
in a typical 
week
Partner 
engaged in 
domestic  
labor in last  
two weeks
panel B
Pooled treatment 0.00 0.02 −0.03 0.01 0.01 1.10 0.08
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (1.20) (0.03)
Observations 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,208 1,208 1,208
Mean of control group 
 at endline
0.04 0.20 0.58 0.17 0.95 45.19 0.50
Basic controls X X X X X X X
Extended controls X X X X X X X
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the cluster level. All estimations control for baseline female 
characteristics (whether the woman is head of household, whether she is married, whether she has secondary edu-
cation, whether she is Colombian, whether she is indigenous, whether she is Afro-Ecuadorian, whether she is 
employed, whether she owns the house, and her age); partner characteristics (whether partner has secondary edu-
cation, his age); household characteristics (number of children 0–5 years old, number of children 6–14 years old, 
wealth quartiles); baseline value of outcome variable, and dummy for province stratum. Probit regressions con-
ducted on binary indicators and OLS on continuous indicators. We do not include “hours worked in a typical week” 
as an outcome for women because the percentage of women working is very low. Similarly, we do not include 
“Partner’s hours worked in domestic labor in a typical day” as an outcome because the percentage of partners who 
engaged in domestic labor is relatively low.
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5 to 11 percentage points (Bobonis, González-Brenes, and Castro 2013; Haushofer 
and Shapiro 2013; Perova 2010). Unlike in Mexico where decreases in physical 
violence are accompanied by increases in threats of violence, we find no evidence 
that partners use violence to forcefully extract transfers. Instead, we find decreases 
in violence that are similar in magnitude across transfer modality. Results from 
our study provide promising evidence that transfers not only have the potential to 
decrease multiple forms of IPV in the short-term, but also that cash—that is intended 
to reduce food insecurity—is just as effective as in-kind transfers in decreasing IPV.
We discuss potential pathways through which transfers impacted IPV, and find 
suggestive evidence that they improved female bargaining power, increased domes-
tic labor of both husband and wife, and decreased poverty related stress. In par-
ticular, we find changes in the intra-household allocation of goods toward more 
child-friendly goods, which are more in line with a woman’s preferences. We also 
find large increases in the probability that the husband engaged in domestic labor, 
which could be a sign of increased marital cohesion. For poverty related stress, we 
do not test directly decreases in stress but a companion paper shows that the trans-
fers decreased poverty as measured by the value of consumption, and increased food 
security (Hidrobo et al. 2014). Preliminary evidence from Kenya’s Givedirectly 
evaluation on stress suggests that this is a potential pathway through which some 
transfer programs may affect IPV.
While we find no evidence that transfers are being extracted or leading to conflict 
within relationships, we cannot dismiss extraction or male backlash theories com-
pletely. The transfers were framed as part of a wider food security intervention and 
did not challenge traditional gender roles. Evidence shows that how the intervention 
is framed and labeled affects subsequent behavior (Benhassine et al. 2013, Buller 
et al. forthcoming). Consequently, transfers may not have led to extraction or con-
flict because they were perceived to be for the benefit of the entire household and 
household nutrition is typically thought of as being a domain traditionally controlled 
by women and mothers.
Our study’s uniqueness must be taken into account when generalizing results 
to other contexts. First, the sample is a select population of urban poor living in 
Northern Ecuador, with a high percentage of Colombian born nationals. Moreover, 
since households receiving the government social protection program, BDH, are 
excluded from the program, the demographics of the study sample exclude many 
households with young children. Second, the intervention and period of study was 
six months. The shortness of the intervention may have led beneficiaries to behave 
differently than they would have under a longer term program. However the short 
intervention period minimizes the possibility that impacts are due to selection into 
marriage or marriage dissolution through divorce. Finally, all transfer recipients par-
ticipated in monthly nutrition education sessions, which may have had an empower-
ing effect due to increased information and social networking with fellow recipients 
in their neighborhoods. Although we are not able to directly model the potential 
contribution of these nutrition sessions, our conclusions by modality would not be 
affected since all participants received identical exposure and information.
Although evaluations of CT programs are a promising starting place for research on 
IPV and female income, further experiments exploring dynamics with  employment, 
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micro-credit and other economic empowerment programs are equally important. 
Impacts from employment and micro-credit programs are likely to differ from those 
from CT programs, given that employment and micro-finance may have additional 
psychological and time allocation effects (Heath 2012). In addition, there is need 
for evidence on medium and long-term impacts, carefully accounting for changes 
in partnership dynamics, as evidence has shown that the relationship between IPV 
and income may fluctuate over time (Bobonis, Castro, and Morales 2015). Lastly, 
better data on conflict, stress, and bargaining power are needed in order to better 
understand the pathways through which transfers impact IPV.
Appendix
Table A.1—Intimate Partner Violence Questions
When two people are married or 
live together, they share good and 
bad times. 
Has your husband or partner 
ever…
1 = Yes
2 = No >> 
Next item
In the last 6 
months?
1 = Yes 
2 = No
Has your husband or partner 
ever…
1 = Yes
2 = No >> 
Next item
In the last 6 
months?
1 = Yes 
2 = No
A B A B
T10 Accused you of being 
unfaithful? (Controlling 
behaviors)
T28 Humiliated or insulted 
you in front of others? 
(Emotional violence)
T11 Tried to limit your contact 
with your family with the 
objective of making you 
feel bad? (Controlling 
behaviors)
T19 Tried to strangle or burn 
you? (physical violence)
T20 Attacked you with a knife, 
pistol, or other weapon? 
(physical violence)
T12 Humiliated or insulted you 
with phrases such as “you 
are worthless,” “you never 
do anything,” “or “you 
are stupid”? (Emotional 
violence)
T21 Threatened you with a  
knife, pistol, or other  
weapon? (Physical  
violence)
T13 Threatened to leave you? 
(Emotional violence)
T22 Used physical force to force 
you to have sexual relations 
even though you did not 
want to? (sexual violence)
T14 Threaten to take away 
your children? (Emotional 
violence)
T23 Forced you to perform 
sexual activity that you  
did not approve of?  
(sexual violence)
T24 Threatened to harm you or 
someone you cared about? 
(Emotional violence)
T15 Pushes you, shakes you, or 
throws something at you? 
(Physical violence)
T25 Tried to limit your contact 
with friends? (Controlling 
behaviors)
T16 Slapped or twisted your 
arm? (physical violence)
T26 Wanted to know where 
you were at all times? 
(Controlling behaviors)
T17 Punched you or hit you with 
something that could harm 
you? (Physical violence)
T27 Ignored you or was  
indifferent toward you? 
(Emotional violence)
T18 Kicked you or dragged  
you? (Physical violence)
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